Civil Jury Speaks: Historic Sex Abuse, Institutional Negligence, Ends With $2.3M Verdict In Evans v. CCAST
On October 9, 2025, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice released its post-verdict reasons in Evans v. The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto et al., 2025 ONSC 5652, upholding the jury verdict that awarded over $2.3 million to a survivor of historical childhood sexual abuse.
This decision is a significant development in civil sexual assault litigation and offers valuable guidance for lawyers navigating historical abuse claims, institutional liability, and potentially high-value damages.
Case Overview
After a 20-day jury trial, the jury found both the individual and the organizational defendants liable and awarded Ms. Evans over $2.3 million in damages, as follows.
Against the Estate of Mr. Kaczmarczyk and the CCAST jointly, the jury awarded:
$400,000 for general and aggravated damages,
$940,000 for loss of income due to the long-term impact of the abuse, and
$50,000 for future counselling and mental health support.
Against Mr. Kaczmarczyk’s Estate only, the jury awarded:
$1,000,000 in punitive damages, sending a strong message of condemnation.
Key Legal Issues and Takeaways for Counsel
1. Amending the Claim Post-Verdict
Justice Callaghan allowed the plaintiff to amend her claim to reflect the jury’s award, applying Rule 26.01 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure. The decision reaffirms that amendments post-verdict are permissible unless they cause non-compensable prejudice.
The court relied on Hill v. Church of Scientology[1], emphasizing that a jury’s award exceeding the pleaded amount does not, in itself, constitute prejudice. The Estate’s objections — focused on the lack of a punitive damages range provided to the jury — were dismissed as tactical choices made by all parties.
Practice Point: Counsel should not hesitate to seek amendments post-verdict to align pleadings with jury findings. This case supports an approach that prioritizes substantive justice over technical pleading limits.
2. Punitive Damages Against a Deceased Defendant
The Estate sought to set aside or reduce the punitive damages award, raising the following arguments:
1. The defendant is deceased, and therefore punitive damages serve no purpose since specific deterrence is no longer possible.
2. Prior criminal proceedings and bail conditions constituted sufficient punishment.
3. The award was excessive and out of step with precedent.
4. The award punishes the heirs to the Estate.
Justice Callaghan rejected all three arguments, finding:
Punitive damages serve broader purposes than punishing the individual wrongdoer. They also aim to deter others and express societal condemnation of egregious conduct. These objectives remain valid even when the perpetrator is dead.
Prior criminal proceedings were insufficient. Although Kaczmarczyk was charged, he was never convicted, and the case never went to trial. Bail conditions alone do not constitute punishment or public denunciation.
The award was proportionate to the severity of the abuse. Testimony from the defence expert Dr. Phillip Klassen, a psychiatrist, described the abuse as the worst case of child sexual assault he had encountered. The jury clearly accepted the plaintiff’s account and the expert’s assessment. Justice Callaghan referenced Hill v. Church of Scientology, where a jury awarded $800,000 in punitive damages in 1992 ($1.5 million in 2025 dollars) upheld through multiple appeals, as a precedent for allowing substantial awards when warranted.
The award does not punish the Estate’s heirs; it compensates the victim. Heirs are only entitled to the residue of an estate after debts are paid.
The Court found no basis to interfere with the jury’s punitive damages award, reinforcing the role of such awards in cases of extreme misconduct.
Practice Point: This decision confirms that high punitive damages awards can be made posthumously and in historical abuse cases, even where the perpetrator was charged criminally and involved in criminal proceedings.
3. Joint and Several Liability
CCAST sought to avoid joint liability, arguing its negligence should not be equated with Kaczmarczyk’s intentional misconduct. The Court disagreed, affirming that under Ontario’s Negligence Act, concurrent tortfeasors — including those liable in connection with intentional torts — can be held jointly and severally liable.
Practice Point: Institutional defendants — such as child protection agencies, schools, or religious organizations — can be held jointly and severally liable alongside individual perpetrators, even when their conduct differs in nature (e.g. systemic negligence vs. intentional abuse). This principle is especially critical in cases involving institutional omissions or failures to protect, where the institution's inaction contributes to the harm. In such cases, jury apportionment of fault does not limit the plaintiff’s recovery. As affirmed in Evans v. CCAST, a plaintiff may recover the entire award from any one defendant, regardless of the jury’s apportionment of liability. The right to full recovery is preserved under Ontario’s Negligence Act, leaving defendants to resolve contribution and indemnity among themselves.
4. Prejudgment Interest (PJI)
The Court awarded prejudgment interest from June 1992, when the plaintiff first sought therapeutic assistance. Despite defence arguments about delay and financial hardship aimed at reducing the rate of PJI and having it run from the date the claim was served (2019) or the date the plaintiff learned that the defendant had won the lottery and decided to reengage (2010), the Court upheld the presumptive (in Ontario) 5% rate for non-pecuniary damages and 2% for pecuniary damages.
The resulting PJI awards were substantial:
$660,000 for general and aggravated damages, and
$318,833.46 for past income loss.
Practice Point: In historical sexual assault cases in Ontario, the point from which prejudgment interest runs and the rate to be applied are often points of contention amongst the parties. In this case, we see the date of therapeutic disclosure being used to establish when the cause of action arose for interest accrual purposes, even where thought the plaintiff had confronted her perpetrator 30 years earlier in 1964 and started her action in 2019. Counsel should come prepared with supporting evidence and case law to argue this issue because prejudgment interest can significantly increase the amount of the award, in this case resulting in far more than the $2.3 million in damages.
Why This Case Matters for Lawyers
Evans v. CCAST is a precedent-setting case that will shape future litigation involving:
Historical sexual assault claims
Institutional negligence
High-value punitive damages awards
Complex apportionment and liability issues
Survivors with delayed disclosure and therapeutic timelines
If you are counsel to a client considering a civil claim for historical abuse, or if you are seeking co-counsel with experience in trauma-informed litigation and complex damages advocacy, I welcome referrals and collaboration.
At Lerners LLP, we have the depth of experience and resources to handle these cases with the sensitivity and strategic rigour they require.
[1]Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130.
Contact MADELEINE Today
Lerners understands you need someone to believe in you. Our consultations are free. Call today and let us help you and your family.
